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Annotated Bibliography on 
Independent Prison Oversight 
 
Michele Deitch 
 
The body of literature regarding correctional oversight is 
both limited and fragmented, posing a significant challenge to 
policy makers, practitioners, scholars, and advocates who seek 
to engage this important issue.  Indeed, much of the literature 
surrounding this topic is to be found in the form of reports, 
speeches, unpublished essays, and chapters of books—none of 
which is easy to identify, locate, or collect.  To add to the 
challenge, much of the existing material comes from 
international sources.  This material has never been gathered 
previously in one place. 
In preparation for the conference ―Opening Up a Closed 
World: What Constitutes Effective Prison Oversight?,‖ held at 
the University of Texas in 2006, graduate students in my 
seminar on ―Prisons and Human Rights‖ embarked on a major 
group effort to compile and review the literature dealing with 
independent oversight of prisons and to develop an annotated 
bibliography of this material. 
 
 Senior Lecturer, The University of Texas at Austin-Lyndon B. Johnson 
School of Public Affairs and the University of Texas School of Law. B.A. 
Amherst College; M.Sc. Oxford University; J.D. Harvard Law School.  The 
author is grateful to the Open Society Institute of the Soros Foundation for 
awarding me a Soros Senior Justice Fellowship from 2005-06 to support my 
research on the subject of correctional oversight. 
This Annotated Bibliography was originally prepared as a research project 
conducted by University of Texas graduate students in my interdisciplinary 
seminar on Prisons and Human Rights during the spring of 2006.  The 
research for and drafting of the original 2006 bibliography was done by: 
Fabiola Flores (School of Law), Crystal Jones (Lyndon B. Johnson School of 
Public Affairs), Bryan McCann (Department of Journalism), and David 
Wagner (School of Law).  The original draft was presented to participants in 
the ―Opening Up a Closed World: What Constitutes Effective Prison 
Oversight?‖ conference held at the University of Texas in April 2006, a 
conference that I chaired and organized.  The Bibliography has since been 
significantly restructured and updated.  I would be grateful if readers who 
identify other helpful resources can bring them to my attention, as I seek to 
maintain a current database of this material.  I may be reached at: 
Michele.Deitch@mail.utexas.edu. 
1
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What follows is an Annotated Bibliography1 of this 
literature and other resources, representing the 
recommendations, methods, and experiences of a diverse group 
of experts on the issue of independent prison oversight and 
closely related issues.  While the students strived to include as 
much of the key literature as was feasible, this is by no means 
a comprehensive listing of everything that has ever been 
written on the subject.  I have updated and restructured the 
bibliography to include a number of important publications 
issued since the 2006 conference and to recognize various 
developments in this arena. 
The purpose of this bibliography is to serve as a resource 
for those stakeholders who wish to develop or analyze 
mechanisms to enhance transparency and accountability in 
correctional operations.  Ideally, it will inspire some creative 
thinking about the need for external prison oversight, the 
various ways in which oversight mechanisms can be 
structured, and the tasks to be performed by monitoring 
entities. 
 
I. Research Findings 
 
Before turning to the Bibliography itself, it might be 
instructive to provide a brief discussion and analysis of what 
the literature on this topic revealed. 
 
A.  Oversight Mechanisms 
 
Correctional oversight bodies tend to fall into one of four 
categories: trans-national quasi-governmental groups; non-
governmental organizations (NGOs); government agencies; and 
citizen participation.  Trans-national quasi-governmental 
groups such as Europe‘s Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture (CPT) and the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) are independent bodies with formal rights of 
access to detention facilities across nations.  The United 
 
1
 Editor’s Note: This Annotated Bibliography is designed to be accessible to 
those both inside and outside of the legal academic community.  As such, 
sources have been cited according to the author’s preference; they do not 
conform to The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/20
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Nations also requires countries to submit individual reports 
documenting their compliance with the Convention Against 
Torture.  Human rights organizations such as Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch typically do not 
possess the same level of access to prisons as do those trans-
national entities, so these NGOs gather their information 
about prison conditions and the treatment of prisoners from 
different sources and focus their efforts on articulating human 
rights standards and recommending the development of official 
oversight mechanisms.  Trans-national groups and NGOs are 
generally guided in their efforts by international human rights 
instruments. 
Many governments in other countries and, to a much 
lesser degree, in the United States have created external 
oversight mechanisms for prisons and jails that involve routine 
monitoring.  The external oversight bodies have taken different 
forms, from independent Prison Inspectorates to Inspectors 
General to Ombudsmen, and all have formal access to prison 
facilities.  Some of these are stand-alone entities, while others 
are affiliated with a legislative or executive branch entity.  The 
literature discussed in this bibliography provides a closer look 
at how some of these bodies are structured and what makes 
them effective in their work. 
Oversight models in a number of countries and states often 
rely upon citizens to provide oversight of prisons.  Trained 
volunteers participate on inspection teams and on civilian 
review boards, and in some cases civilian lawyers get involved 
in Internal Review units.  Striking examples of civilian 
involvement in oversight are found in the United Kingdom, 
South Africa, New York, and Illinois, and advocates in Canada 
have long called for the involvement of citizens in reviewing 
agency decisions to place a prisoner in administrative 
segregation. 
Historically in the United States, the responsibility of 
prison oversight has fallen to the federal courts, which in 
extreme cases have set up offices that conduct routine 
monitoring of prison facilities to ensure compliance with court-
ordered improvements in conditions.2  Judicial intervention 
 
2. For example, in the landmark case of Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 
1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980), amended and vacated in part by, 688 F.2d 266 (5th 
Cir. 1982). Judge William Wayne Justice set up the Office of the Special 
3
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serves a very different function than the routine monitoring 
conducted by the oversight bodies discussed here, since courts 
get involved only after a facility is determined to have 
unconstitutional conditions and since this type of oversight is 
not intended to be ongoing in nature.  There is a healthy body 
of available literature on the subject of judicial intervention in 
prisons, and this Bibliography only touches on this subject 
briefly.3 
 
B.  Major Themes in the Literature 
 
This literature review reveals a significant difference 
between the ways imprisonment is viewed in the United States 
and in other countries.  Non-U.S. authors overwhelmingly 
stress the need for oversight on the basis that imprisonment 
and the deprivation of liberty represents the most power a 
government can exercise over individuals.  Such a profound 
expression of state force, therefore, requires extensive scrutiny.  
This rationale is conspicuously absent in most of the literature 
about oversight coming from the United States, as is the 
related effort to ground oversight in basic human rights 
principles.  While this reflects, in part, a cultural difference 
among nations, presumably it also stems from a recognition on 
the part of advocates in the United States that policy-makers 
are more likely to be moved by arguments about the cost-
effectiveness of preventive oversight and the efficiencies and 
improvements in prison operations that can result from outside 
scrutiny. 
A number of the annotated works emphasize that 
oversight models must be developed to meet the specific needs, 
culture, and situation of a particular jurisdiction.  A ―one-size-
fits-all‖ approach to oversight is unrealistic, and even the best 
of models cannot be simply transferred to another jurisdiction 
 
Master, a 10-person office responsible for monitoring conditions in all Texas 
prisons and reporting to the court and the parties on the prison agency‘s 
compliance with court orders.  The office existed from 1981 until 1990.  The 
author served as a full-time court-appointed monitor in this office from 1987 
to 1990. 
3. One of the best sources on the topic of court oversight of prisons is a 
previous volume of the PACE LAW REVIEW that contains the proceedings of the 
symposium ―Prison Reform Revisited:  The Unfinished Agenda,‖ 24 PACE L. 
REV. (2004) (discussed infra, p. 1733). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/20
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without modification.  That said, it is striking how many of the 
countries highlighted in this literature review demonstrated a 
familiarity with other oversight systems and sought to create 
oversight structures modeled on these bodies.  The British 
Prison Inspectorate is often held up as one of the most effective 
oversight bodies created at a national level, and there are 
oversight entities around the world that have sought to 
emulate this structure. 
Virtually every work describing an oversight model 
stresses the importance of ―independence.‖  Independence is a 
complicated concept, but at its core, it means both that an 
oversight entity should be independent of the body that it 
oversees and that it should exercise independence of judgment 
about how to respond to the problems it identifies.  Also critical 
is routine monitoring—not just investigations of past 
wrongdoing—in order to prevent prisoner abuse and to ensure 
early detention of problems before misconduct occurs and 
lawsuits are filed.  Other core features of effective prison 
monitoring include the need for confidentiality on the part of 
those who speak with the inspectors and the ability of monitors 
to work collaboratively with prison officials to ensure that 
changes get implemented. 
We were also struck by the extent to which the literature 
on police oversight raises numerous considerations that 
parallel the concerns of those interested in making prisons 
more transparent and accountable.  While the two types of 
oversight are not by any means identical, we believe that the 
literature on police oversight provides a valuable frame of 
reference, especially since police oversight is currently much 
more established in the United States than is correctional 
oversight.  Police oversight mechanisms have some 
applicability to the enterprise of monitoring prisons and jails, 
and oversight practitioners in the law enforcement field have 
faced many of the same challenges and questions that daunt 
those who propose correctional oversight mechanisms. 
Finally, we noted many instances in which the literature 
references oversight of a particular aspect of prison operations 
or conditions, or oversight of a particular segment of the 
prisoner population.  Such ―issue-specific‖ oversight tends to be 
more evident in the United States, whereas in Europe and 
beyond, every aspect of the prison environment is seen to 
5
1692 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:5 
justify external scrutiny.  In the United States, for example, 
there is some literature available about monitoring private 
prison operations.  Oversight of private prison facilities tends 
to fall in most cases to the public agencies with whom the 
private vendors contract.  Yet oversight of private prisons and 
jails poses unique challenges, because most monitoring is 
limited to ensuring compliance with contractual terms.  If those 
underlying contracts do not contain provisions relating to the 
treatment of prisoners or the quality of conditions in the 
facility, as many contracts unfortunately fail to do, the ability 
to monitor these facilities effectively and hold private providers 
accountable for the protection of prisoners is significantly 
lessened.  The annotated literature offers a number of 
suggestions for those who wish to ensure greater transparency 
and accountability in private prison operations. 
Many of the works discussed here identify the need for 
external scrutiny in order to protect inmates from sexual 
assault, an issue that is receiving increasing levels of attention 
in the United States in the wake of the work of the National 
Prison Rape Elimination Commission and the requirements of 
the Prison Rape Elimination Act.4  Similarly, many works 
highlight the need to address the concerns of mentally ill and 
physically disabled inmates.  As the public becomes more 
aware of the special challenges faced by mentally ill inmates 
and the difficulties this population poses for prison officials, 
there is increasing interest on the part of both advocates and 
policy-makers in ensuring that this population receives 
appropriate treatment.  Thus, external oversight is seen as 
especially necessary for this segment of the prison population. 
 
II. Organization of the Annotated Bibliography 
 
We begin this literature review by highlighting sources 
that provide a general overview of the correctional oversight 
issue, including writings that speak to the importance and 
need for independent oversight, articles that discuss the 
meaning of this concept, and publications that provide 
guidance on how to conduct monitoring activities.  We then 
 
4. Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-79, 117 Stat. 
972. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/20
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turn to a focus on international oversight models, including 
both trans-national oversight bodies and oversight mechanisms 
that exist in specific countries.  Also included are sources that 
compare the correctional oversight mechanisms in various 
countries. 
Next, we identify resources about correctional oversight in 
the United States.  Again, we begin with some general sources 
that discuss the range of oversight models that exist 
domestically; then we address the role that litigation has 
traditionally played in protecting prisoners‘ rights.  We go on to 
offer resources that provide more detail about the prison and 
jail oversight bodies that exist in specific states and the federal 
system. 
Finally, we identify literature that discusses the potential 
for oversight of specific correctional issues, such as private 
prisons, sexual assault, and mental health and disability 
issues.  We also offer a variety of sources on police oversight. 
Again, this Annotated Bibliography is not comprehensive, 
but it provides a helpful starting place for research in any of 
these areas.  We should also note that the Pace Law Review 
volume in which this article appears constitutes a virtual 
sourcebook of information on prison oversight and has some of 
the most relevant articles available on this subject.  Most of the 
articles in this volume are not discussed separately in this 
Bibliography, but nevertheless deserve special attention by any 
reader studying the oversight field. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
While the literature discussing prison oversight is not 
nearly as extensive as it should be, a number of valuable 
resources still exist.  This literature review is designed to 
organize this body of work in a manner that will be valuable to 
both practitioners and scholars.  Holding prisons accountable 
to the standards of human rights is a complicated enterprise, 
but also an indispensable one.  Oversight is a critical issue that 
affects both human rights concerns and correctional 
management and operations.  The organizations, nations, and 
states described in the literature annotated here offer 
standards, mechanisms, and insights that, we hope, will 
provide a meaningful perspective on how prison oversight can 
7
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be developed and practiced effectively, and how it can help lead 
to the more humane operation of prisons. 
I. General Information about Correctional 
Oversight 
 
A.  Overview of Oversight Models and Issues 
 
American Bar Association (2008).  Resolution 104B: 
Prison oversight and monitoring of juvenile and 
adult facilities.  Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/policy/am08104b.p
df  
 
Official ABA policy now urges federal, state, local, and 
tribal governments to develop and support independent 
oversight mechanisms for all places of detention in that 
jurisdiction.  This resolution and the accompanying 
report include detailed recommendations to ensure that 
such oversight bodies are effective.  These documents 
provide an excellent starting place for any jurisdiction 
considering the development of a correctional oversight 
body. 
 
American Bar Association (2010).  Criminal Justice 
Standards (3rd Ed.).  Treatment of Prisoners. 
Retrieved on April 26, 2010, from 
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/policy/midyear201
0/102i.pdf 
 
 
The ABA‘s Standards on prisoners‘ rights, recently 
revised for the first time in 30 years, include important 
provisions relevant to correctional oversight.  Part XI of 
the Standards (Standards 23-11.1–23-11.5), entitled 
―Accountability and Oversight,‖ include provisions on 
the topics of internal accountability, external regulation 
and investigation, external monitoring and inspection, 
legislative oversight and accountability, and media 
access to correctional facilities and prisoners.  While 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/20
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these standards are not binding on any jurisdiction, 
they provide important guidance to judges, 
practitioners, advocates, and policy-makers, and 
represent the best thinking of a range of criminal justice 
and corrections experts and legal scholars from a wide 
variety of perspectives. 
 
Deitch, M. (2006). Opening Up a Closed World: What 
Constitutes Effective Prison Oversight? Conference 
Proceedings. Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public 
Affairs, The University of Texas at Austin.  
Retrieved on February 12, 2010, from 
http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/prisonconference/. 
 
This website contains the proceedings of the 
international conference on prison oversight held at the 
University of Texas in 2006.  This was an invitation-
only event that brought together 115 of the world‘s 
leading experts, including prison officials, attorneys, 
human rights advocates, representatives of all the major 
correctional oversight bodies, scholars, judges, and 
policy-makers.  Available online are videos of all 
conference sessions held over two days, including both 
panel discussions and keynote speeches; summaries of 
all presentations made at the conference; a copy of the 
conference agenda; a list of speakers and participants; 
and copies of handouts describing various models of 
correctional oversight.  This is the most comprehensive 
source available for anyone researching the topic of 
prison oversight. 
 
Deitch, M. (2006, February 8). Effective Prison 
Oversight. Written Testimony Submitted to the 
Commission on Safety and Abuse in America‘s 
Prisons – 4th Hearing. Retrieved on May 20, 2010, 
from http://www.prisoncommission.org/ 
statements/deitch_michele.pdf. 
 
Michele Deitch provides an overview of the prison 
oversight issue, discussing in depth the distinctions 
among different types of monitoring functions with a 
9
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primary focus on the value of the inspection and 
monitoring function and what it provides above and 
beyond other types of oversight.  She offers examples of 
the range of correctional oversight bodies that exist both 
internationally and in the United States, and details the 
essential elements of an effective prison monitoring 
system.  She also highlights the benefits of external 
monitoring for corrections officials. 
 
Deitch, M. (2010). Distinguishing the Various Functions 
of Effective Prison Oversight.  30 Pace Law 
Review 1438 (2010). www.law.pace.edu/plr 
 
This short piece provides an analytic framework for 
thinking about prison oversight.  Noting that the term 
―oversight‖ lacks a clear meaning and that the different 
functions of prison oversight are often confused and 
seen as in competition with each other, the author 
distinguishes several important functions provided by 
oversight mechanisms, including regulation, audit, 
accreditation, investigation, legal, reporting, and 
monitoring.  Each of these is a distinct element of 
effective prison oversight, but all these functions need 
not be served by the same oversight body.  ―Oversight‖ 
is really an umbrella concept that encompasses each of 
these functions, and the focus of reformers should be on 
ensuring that each function is served effectively in every 
jurisdiction.  The ideal is to have a layered system of 
correctional oversight in which there is a range of 
effective internal accountability measures and robust 
external oversight mechanisms.    
 
Deitch, M. (2010).  Special Populations and the 
Importance of Prison Oversight. 37 (3) American 
Journal of Criminal Law __ (Summer 2010). 
 
This article discusses the critical need for the 
development of effective, independent oversight 
mechanisms to ensure that prisons and jails become 
more transparent in their operations and more 
accountable for the protection of the rights of prisoners.  
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/20
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The author argues that the need is especially great 
when it comes to the protection of vulnerable prisoners, 
including inmates housed in segregation, those at 
greatest risk for sexual assault, prisoners who are 
mentally ill or physically disabled, and prisoners with 
serious medical needs.  The article highlights examples 
of independent oversight entities that can serve as 
models, and identifies the essential elements of effective 
prison oversight.  The piece is based on the author‘s 
invited testimony to the National Prison Rape 
Elimination Commission.  
 
Dickey, W. (2006, February 8). The Management of 
Prisons in a Democratic Society.  Written 
Testimony Submitted to the Commission on 
Safety and Abuse in America‘s Prisons – 4th 
Hearing. Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/dick
ey_walter.pdf. 
 
The central theme of this paper is that prisons should 
be run in a manner consistent with the values of a 
democratic society.  As such, the public should have 
access to prison rules, the legislature should conduct 
oversight of prison rule-making and administration, and 
prisons should be as transparent and visible as possible.  
 
B.  Monitoring Techniques 
 
Association of Members of Independent Monitoring 
Boards. (2005). Practical guide to monitoring 
prisons. (3rd ed.).  
 
 Produced for members of U.K. prison monitoring boards, 
this guide lists over 900 questions for monitors to use 
when examining prison conditions.  Sections are cross-
referenced and include: reception and introduction 
(intake), regime, food and prison environment, health, 
safer custody, religion, race relations, applications and 
complaints, special categories (juveniles, women, 
elderly), security, order and control, resettlement 
11
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(release), management, and independent monitoring 
boards.  The book notes that while some questions are 
direct, others are more open-ended and thus allow for 
monitors to exercise their own judgment depending on 
the context of the situation.  
 
Association for the Prevention of Torture; OSCE. Office 
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. 
(2007). Monitoring Places of Detention: A Practical 
Guide. Switzerland. Retrieved on February 9, 
2010, from http://www.apt.ch/component/ 
option,com_docman/task,cat_view/gid,57/Itemid,59
/lang,en/.  
 
This updated manual provides technical guidance for 
NGOs and other bodies entitled to conduct monitoring 
visits to places of detention.  It defends the importance 
of maintaining NGO monitoring groups as an 
independent and more permanent complement to 
national and international monitoring mechanisms.  
The manual also includes a section on specific 
conditions that should be examined, and the applicable 
international standards. 
 
Coyle, A.  (2002). Human Rights Approach to Prison 
Management: A Handbook for Prison Staff.  
International Centre for Prison Studies. 
Retrieved on February 9, 2010, from 
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/law/research/icps/dow
nloads/handbook_2nd_ed_eng_8.pdf. 
 
This all-inclusive handbook is an important resource for 
prison staff who wish to implement various 
international human rights standards in their practical 
day-to-day work.  Among the various topics covered, the 
handbook stresses the importance of inspections.  Before 
delving into a variety of inspection procedures, author 
Andrew Coyle, a former prison administrator, explains 
the value of these processes.  Inspections are divided 
into informal and formal mechanisms that can take the 
shape of something as simple as regular contact 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/20
2010] ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 1699 
between the prison and community agencies, to much 
more formalized monitoring bodies.  The manual 
explains that administrative inspections that audit 
procedures, though important, are not sufficient to 
protect human rights.  Independent inspections are the 
best method and the author argues that the most 
independent of these oversight bodies involve inspectors 
who are appointed by legislatures and report back to 
them.  The section on inspections closes with a section 
entitled ―Putting it into Practice,‖ which helps translate 
these standards into practical procedures for 
correctional staff. 
 
Coyle, A. (2003).  Humanity in prison.  London:  
International Centre for Prison Studies. 
 
Andrew Coyle provides a draft audit instrument as a 
mechanism for ensuring humane treatment in prisons.  
It is intended for broad use either by prison 
administrators or by independent investigators.  The 
audit instrument uses an exhaustive questionnaire 
addressing virtually all facets of prison life and 
administration and it relies primarily on qualitative 
measures. 
 
Nowicki, M., & Fialova, Z. (2001). Human rights 
monitoring. Warszawa: Helsinki Foundation for 
Human Rights. Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.hfhrpol.waw.pl/pliki/Monitoring_eng.p
df 
 
A training manual designed for NGO watchdog 
organizations, this handbook provides extensive, 
detailed guidance on developing and conducting 
monitoring visits, and methods for reporting results of 
human rights inspections.  It was developed based on 
the experiences of Polish NGOs, state inspectors, and 
intergovernmental groups such as the CPT, and it 
incorporated feedback from trainees.  The handbook 
provides information on the purposes of monitoring, 
technical assistance in developing strategies, creating a  
13
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team, conducting monitoring visits, investigating data, 
collecting evidence, and distributing the report.  
 
Penal Reform International.  (2001).  Making Standards 
Work:  An International Handbook on Good Prison 
Practice.  2nd Ed. London:  Astron Printers. 
Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.penalreform.org/files/man-2001-
making-standards-work-en.pdf 
 
This publication advocates an integrated approach to 
prison inspection, recommending internal and external, 
official and unofficial, national, regional, and universal 
mechanisms for oversight.  Throughout, the authors 
emphasize the need for independence.  They recommend 
that outside entities that specialize in specific areas 
perform inspections consistent with their particular 
expertise.  The volume also advocates a dynamic 
inspection process so as to prevent co-optation of 
inspectors by the prison environment.  All 
recommendations are grounded in the United Nations‘ 
Standard Minimum Rules (SMR).  
 
II. International Oversight Models 
 
A.  Trans-National Models 
 
1. International Committee of the Red Cross  
 
Aeschlimann, A.  (2005).  Protection of detainees:  ICRC 
action behind bars.  International Review of the 
Red Cross, 87, 83-122.  Retrieved May 20, 2010, 
from http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/ 
htmlall/review-857-p83/$File/irrc_857_ 
Aeschelimann.pdf 
 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
outlines its procedures for investigating the treatment 
of detainees.  The document emphasizes the flexibility 
in standards and procedures that is contingent upon the 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/20
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context of the investigation.  For instance, the facility at 
Guantanamo Bay is likely to be approached differently 
than an aged prison in a developing country.  Inspectors 
meet with both prisoners and staff, taking special care 
to educate the latter on international standards and 
legal matters, as well as on steps that can be taken 
toward improving conditions.  The ICRC is also careful 
to use the same representatives for regular 
investigations of any one location to facilitate an 
ongoing dialogue with the institution and its detainees.  
The resulting dialogue from inspections remains 
confidential between the ICRC and administrators in 
the interest of building trust.   
 
International Committee of the Red Cross.  (2004, 
February 7).  ICRC visits to persons deprived of 
their freedom:  An internationally mandated task, 
implemented worldwide.  Retrieved May 20, 2010, 
from http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/ 
siteeng0.nsf/iwpList265/4C2DE1E5ED3C7C9DC125
6B660061123E 
 
The ICRC briefly describes its rationale and 
methodology for visiting detainees.  The standard 
procedures include the registration of prisoners, an 
overview of all facilities, private talks with detainees, 
and delivery of written messages to their families.  Any 
problems are only taken to authorities with the express 
permission of the detainee.  Reports are given directly to 
detaining authorities and are not intended for 
publication. 
 
2. United Nations 
 
Centre for Human Rights, & Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice Branch. (1994). Supervision of 
places of detention. In Human rights and pre-trial 
detention: A handbook of international standards 
relating to pre-trial detention (pp. 35-37). 
Professional training series no. 3. New York: 
United Nations.  
15
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Of particular interest in this manual is the standard 
dealing with ―Supervision of Places of Detention,‖ which 
asserts that ―effective supervision of places of detention 
by impartial authorities interested in maintaining 
humane treatment is vital for the protection of human 
rights of detainees.‖  The manual lists relevant 
international standards pertaining to issues such as the 
ability of prisoners to make confidential complaints and 
the authorities‘ ability to investigate unnatural deaths.  
The manual provides an interpretation of these 
international standards and offers practical guidelines 
for administering them. 
 
Committee Against Torture. (n.d.).  Monitoring the 
prevention of torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. Retrieved 
May 20, 2010, from http://www2.ohchr.org/ 
english/bodies/cat/index.htm 
 
This webpage includes a brief description and detailed 
links associated with the work of the U.N. Committee 
against Torture (CAT).  The group comprises a body of 
independent experts that monitor the implementation of 
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment by 
state parties.  All countries are required to submit 
reports to the committee to describe how rights are 
being implemented.  CAT also can consider individual 
complaints, undertake inquiries, and consider inter-
country complaints. 
 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
(2001). Visits to persons in detention. In Training 
manual on human rights monitoring (pp. 127-147). 
Professional training series no. 7. New York: 
United Nations.  
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While the entire manual provides useful advice on 
conducting monitoring, the chapter ―Visits to Persons in 
Detention‖ provides detailed information on standards 
applicable to detention issues and special populations.  
It also offers guidance on conducting both global 
monitoring (visits to an entire detention facility) and 
focused monitoring (more specific inquiries related to a 
particular issue or person).  The guidance provided is 
comprehensive and covers pre-visit issues (such as 
setting objectives and selecting sites), monitoring issues 
(such as interviewing detainees), and follow-up and 
reporting guidance.  The chapter stresses the 
importance of coordinating with the International 
Committee of the Red Cross. 
 
3. Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) 
 
Casale, S. (2006). Mechanisms for Custodial Oversight: 
The United States and Europe. 22 Washington 
University Journal of Law and Policy 217. 
Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from 
http://law.wustl.edu/Journal/22/p217Casale.pdf 
  
Dr. Silvia Casale, the then-President of the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT), 
provides a detailed description of the structure and 
function of the CPT correctional oversight mechanism in 
place throughout Europe.  Of particular importance to 
the CPT‘s work is its independence, access to all places 
of detention, impartiality, expertise, maintenance of 
confidentiality, and ability to work collaboratively with 
prison officials.  The CPT does not have enforcement 
authority, so it relies on the power of persuasion.  The 
work of the CPT is forward-looking, seeking to prevent 
human rights violations rather than to investigate past 
misconduct.  
 
 
 
 
17
1704 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:5 
Council of Europe Committee of Ministers.  (2006).  
Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to 
member states on the European Prison Rules.  
Retrieved May 20, 2010, from 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=Rec(2006)2&S
ector=secCM&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=origina
l&BackColorInternet=9999CC&BackColorIntrane
t=FFBB55&BackColorLogged=FFAC75 
 
This document urges countries that are members of the 
Council of Europe to abide by the European Prison 
Rules, which are attached as an Appendix to the 
document.  The European Prison Rules provide an 
exhaustive set of standards designed to ensure prison 
safety, security, and discipline while not undermining 
prisoners‘ individual dignity and rehabilitation.  The 
standards outline basic principles of human rights and 
inspections, and provide detailed guidance on issues 
such as conditions of imprisonment, health, good order, 
safety, discipline, and use of force.  Moreover, the 
European Prison Rules mandate that prisons be 
inspected regularly by a government body to ensure 
compliance with the rules, and that there be monitoring 
by an independent body to assess the treatment of 
prisoners.  
 
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.  
(2004).  The CPT standards:  “Substantive” sections 
of the CPT’s general reports.  Retrieved May 20, 
2010, from http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/ 
documents/eng-standards-scr.pdf 
 
This document briefly describes the standards that 
guide the CPT‘s periodic and ad-hoc prison inspections. 
These standards include provisions regarding 
overcrowding, recreation, disciplinary procedures, 
health care, the treatment of foreign nationals, women, 
and juveniles, and criteria for the placement of inmates 
in psychiatric facilities.  The report is intended to 
provide authorities with clear guidance as to how 
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prisoners and other persons deprived of their liberty 
should be treated and to stimulate discussion about 
these issues.  
 
Kellberg, L. (2001). The European Convention for the 
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment. In G. Alfredsson, J. 
Grimheden, B. G. Ramcharan, & A. de Zayas 
(Eds.), International human rights monitoring 
mechanisms: Essays in honour of Jakob Th. Möller 
(Vol. 7, pp. 587-599). The Raoul Wallenberg 
Institute Human Rights Library. The Hague, The 
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International.  
 
This article describes the creation, composition, powers, 
and duties of the CPT.  The committee aims to prevent 
ill-treatment by initiating periodic, ad hoc, and follow-
up visits to public and private places of detention in 
participating countries.  Committee members gather 
information by examining the physical conditions of 
confinement, and speaking to staff, detainees, 
government authorities, and other interested parties, 
such as families and NGOs.  The author notes the 
importance of the CPT‘s non-confrontational role, as 
evidenced by its promise of confidentiality and role as a 
provider of assistance to detention officials.  Specifically, 
the CPT attempts to resolve concerns it identifies 
directly with government authorities, and reports can 
only be released by those authorities (the CPT 
encourages them to release these reports). 
 
Morgan, R., & Evans, M.  (2001).  Combating torture in 
Europe.  Strasbourg Cedex: Council of Europe 
Publishing. 
 
In this important book, Morgan and Evans outline the 
history, procedures, and standards of the CPT.  The 
CPT has unlimited access to correctional facilities 
located in countries belonging to the Council of Europe, 
and it conducts periodic and ad hoc visits to detention 
facilities throughout these countries.  CPT inspectors 
19
1706 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:5 
are in constant dialogue with the prison administration 
through every phase of the inspection.  Reports of visits 
are released only to government authorities, and 
officials there decide whether to release the report 
publicly.  Follow-up visits are expected and initial 
inspections are always understood to be part of a larger 
process.  The book also outlines the CPT‘s standards 
with regard to what constitutes torture and inhumane 
and degrading treatment, different categories of 
detainees, and safety and health standards for 
prisoners.  The book closes with an assessment of the 
CPT‘s achievements to date and what lies ahead as the 
Council of Europe grows in importance and 
membership. 
 
Africa‘s Special Rapporteur on Prisons Vilijoen, F. 
(2005). The Special Rapporteur on Prisons and 
Conditions of Detention in Africa: Achievements 
and possibilities. 27 Human Rights Quarterly 125-
71 (2005).  
 
The article extensively reviews the creation, activities, 
strengths, and weaknesses of the Special Rapporteur on 
Prisons (SRP), a position established by the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights.  The SRP 
examines the situation of persons deprived of their 
liberty within the countries that are party to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples‘ Rights (131).  The 
SRP‘s four main activities include: investigating and 
reporting through country visits (the SRP must be 
invited by the country‘s government); conducting urgent 
interventions; assisting the Commission with related 
communications; and promoting prisoners‘ rights and 
international standards.  Vilijoen notes that, although 
the SRP overlaps with some international monitoring 
groups, the agency should be seen as complementing 
these groups by providing focused attention on detainee 
rights, and increased follow-up.  The author concludes 
that visits and reporting have been well-conducted, but 
there is little guidance on handling urgent appeals.  He 
also notes that the promotion of prisoners‘ issues has 
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increased awareness among prison officials but not in 
other quarters, and the African Commission has not 
requested SRP consultation on issues related to 
detention.  Finally, Vilijoen makes seven 
recommendations, including some that address SRP‘s 
dependence on the NGO Penal Reform International, 
and the lack of prison monitoring in Northern Africa 
and more populous countries. 
 
B.  National Models (Non-U.S.) 
 
1. Australia 
 
Groves, M. (2002). Ombudsmen‘s Jurisdiction in Prisons.  
28 Monash University Law Review 181-205 (2002).  
 
This article explores the role of Australian ombudsmen 
in that country‘s administrative system, with a 
particular emphasis on their work within the prison 
context.  Groves explains that ombudsmen are 
independent of the executive, can initiate investigations 
in response to complaints or of their own accord, and 
although lacking determinative powers (the ability to 
order a particular action), are still able to exert 
considerable influence on officials to review and 
reconsider decisions.  Groves notes that ombudsmen 
have a right to visit prisoners, that they regularly go to 
prisons to promote awareness of their position and role, 
and that, other than in the state of Tasmania, prisoners 
have an unfettered right to communicate with 
ombudsmen.  Groves concludes that the current 
structure has worked well and argues against granting 
determinative power to ombudsmen for the fear that 
such power might undermine their status as neutral, 
disinterested observers.  
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Office of the Inspector of Custodial Services of Western 
Australia. Annual Report 2008-09.  Retrieved on 
February 7, 2010, from 
http://www.custodialinspector.wa.gov.au/ 
 
The Office of the Inspector of Custodial Services is a 
government office that brings independent and external 
oversight to prisons in Western Australia.  This 
structure is unique in Australia, as it is the only such 
oversight agency that is independent and capable of 
direct access to parliament.  The office is based on the 
British Prison Inspectorate model, and it is required to 
inspect every correctional facility at least once every 
three years.  Most of its inspections are announced a few 
months in advance. 
 
Sands, V. (2004, December). Regulatory independence, 
public accountability and the Victorian prison 
system. 63 (4) Australian Journal of Public 
Administration 50-59 (2004).  
 
This article examines how the move towards 
privatization of public services has affected independent 
monitoring and review of Victoria‘s prisons.  It begins by 
examining the old models of public accountability in 
government generally and then concludes that they are 
no longer workable under the new public management 
(NPM) principles in place today.  Specifically, 
regulations are probed to determine if there has been 
any loss of independence to the oversight mechanisms 
that were in place under the old regulatory scheme.  
After detailing the changes that took place in 1992 and 
again in 2003 with the restructuring for a ―more 
seamless system,‖ the author concludes that the current 
correctional oversight mechanism has suffered a loss of 
independence. 
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2. Canada 
 
Correctional Service of Canada. (1997, December). 
Human rights and corrections: A strategic model. 
Retrieved May 20, 2010, from http://www.csc-
scc.gc.ca/text/pblct/rights/human/toce-eng.shtml 
 
In this report, Canada‘s Working Group on Human 
Rights reviews the Correctional Service of Canada‘s 
(CSC) current systems for ensuring human rights in a 
corrections context, creates a model for evaluating the 
agency‘s compliance with human rights standards, and 
makes recommendations regarding CSC‘s ability to 
achieve compliance and communicate their results. 
Notably, the Working Group focuses on the human 
rights of prisoners, staff, and special populations 
(women and indigenous groups).  Interestingly, the 
group also considers both domestic and international 
legal obligations, including international human rights 
treaties and instruments approved by the Canadian 
Government.  Chapter three of the report compares 
Canada to similar countries and finds that most of these 
countries provide for both internal prison grievance 
systems and external correctional monitoring 
mechanisms. 
 
Jackson, M. (2006). The litmus test of legitimacy: 
Independent adjudication and administrative 
segregation. 48 Canadian Journal of Criminology 
157 (2006). 
 
In this article, Professor Michael Jackson discusses the 
potential for the use of ―independent adjudication‖ (the 
use of decision-makers external to the agency) to review 
the decision to place and retain a prisoner in 
administrative segregation in Canada.  He argues that 
the severity and indefinite duration of administrative 
segregation requires additional measures to ensure that 
human rights standards are met.  The controversy 
surrounding the use of independent adjudicators has 
been examined and debated by numerous government 
23
1710 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:5 
working groups over the past twenty-five years and the 
author chronologically describes these previous groups‘ 
conclusions and their consistent recommendations for 
the use of independent adjudicators in this context.  
Jackson also describes competing arguments made by 
the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) in response to 
these recommendations.  Despite repeated efforts on the 
part of advocates to respond to concerns of the CSC and 
the development of a pilot project, the CSC has 
continued to resist implementation of the proposals, and 
Jackson concludes that CSC is reluctant to have 
independent adjudication of administrative segregation 
because it would subject decisions about prisoners‘ 
rights to outside involvement.  Jackson reinforces the 
need for independent adjudication to ensure fair 
hearings, protection of prisoners, and the creation of re-
integration plans.  He further adds that judicial or 
Parliamentary intervention may be needed to counter 
the CSC‘s continued resistance to independent 
adjudication. 
 
Office of the Correctional Investigator. (2002, December 
20). Mandate, roles and responsibilities. Retrieved 
May 20, 2010, from http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/man-
eng.aspx 
 
The Office of the Correctional Investigator is a 
legislatively-mandated ombudsman for prisoners.  The 
Office investigates prisoner complaints, meets with 
inmate committees, conducts unannounced visits to 
penitentiaries, reviews applicable Correctional Service 
of Canada policies and procedures, and issues annual 
reports to the legislature highlighting issues of concern.  
The Office has significant authority to require the 
production of information during an investigation, but 
maintains integrity by imposing strict requirements to 
ensure requests for information are pertinent and follow 
privacy laws.  In addition, the Office cannot be 
summoned in legal proceedings and its processes are 
independent of appeals before the courts, which ensures 
the Office‘s actions are not compromised by advocates‘ 
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efforts to use the office as a substitute for discovery 
mechanisms or procedural prerequisites. 
 
Sloan, T. (2004, June). Shifting the orbit: Human rights, 
independent review and accountability in the 
Canadian corrections system. Office of the 
Correctional Investigator. Retrieved February 8, 
2010, from http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/rpt/pdf/disc/ 
disc20040629-eng.pdf 
 
This discussion paper forcefully argues for independent 
adjudication of certain decisions made by the 
Correctional Service of Canada (CSC).  The author 
highlights various developments that have had an 
impact on the debate regarding the need for external, 
independent adjudication for CSC.  The paper asserts 
that CSC has allowed citizen involvement in prison 
oversight, but has rejected the notion of independent 
review of grievances or decisions to place an inmate in 
administrative segregation.  The paper discusses issues 
pertaining to the rights of aboriginal offenders and 
makes recommendations regarding independent 
adjudication.   
 
Also, the author summarizes several perspectives 
regarding independent oversight, such as political and 
managerial accountability, sufficiency of current 
oversight, balancing of interests, importance of safety 
and security, and correctional expertise.  Perhaps most 
interesting for researchers canvassing the debate on 
independent adjudication is the last section of the 
paper—―Issues and Options‖—which considers such 
issues as how to weigh offender rights against safety 
and security, and whether allowing CSC to pass difficult 
decisions to outside adjudicators will impact the 
agency‘s accountability and control over prisoners. 
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Trevethan, S., Rastin, C. J., Bell, A., & Gillis, C. (2004, 
June). Citizens’ Advisory Committees in Canada: A 
research report (R. No. 147). Correctional Service 
of Canada, Research Branch. Retrieved May 20, 
2010, from http://www.csc-
scc.gc.ca/text/rsrch/reports/r147/r147-eng.shtml 
 
This report describes the mission of Citizens‘ Advisory 
Committees (CAC) in Canada and evaluates differences 
in CACs, activities, member concerns, and effectiveness. 
The authors also interviewed CAC members to establish 
a profile of those who serve on the committees.  CAC‘s 
were established in the 1960s, and consist of community 
volunteers from an area where a penitentiary or 
Community Correctional Centre is located.  Members 
are appointed by prison wardens or parole office 
directors, and the CACs participate in a number of 
activities.  The author notes that CAC members fulfill 
three main roles: liaison, observer, and advisor.  Finally, 
the authors note that while most members feel satisfied 
with their work, concerns remain about a lack of 
information regarding correctional staff, victims, and 
crisis policies.  Other concerns about the CACs include 
communication, recruitment of members, community 
involvement, and funding. 
 
Zinger, I. (2006).  Human Rights Compliance and the 
Role of External Prison Oversight.  48 Canadian 
Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice 127 
(April 2006).  See also the rest of this special 
volume. 
 
This paper is an introduction to a special volume of the 
Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice 
devoted to issues related to prison oversight in Canada.  
The author notes the ongoing challenges, even in 
advanced democracies, of ensuring legal standards of 
humane detention, and observes that adherence to 
human rights standards is actually the most effective 
correctional management tool that exists.  The author 
reflects on the value of external prison oversight in 
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fostering compliance with these human rights 
requirements.  He argues the need for both effective 
internal accountability measures and external scrutiny, 
and discusses the challenges in striking the correct 
balance between these two important types of oversight.  
Praising the various oversight bodies that exist in 
Canada, the author posits that Canada can play an 
international leadership role when it comes to the 
humane treatment of prisoners.   
 
3. Denmark 
 
Eklundh, C. (2002). The Independence of the 
Ombudsman. In The work and practice of 
Ombudsman and national human rights 
institutions (pp. 13-16). Danish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.  
 
Eklundh reviews the importance of maintaining the 
integrity and independence of the ombudsman position.  
The author stresses that the ombudsman must be 
independent of the executive and judiciary.  While this 
tends to mean the ombudsman is accountable to the 
legislature, the author further notes the importance of 
maintaining a balance between the two parties.  
Methods of accomplishing this include: protecting the 
ombudsman‘s tenure and budget and insulating the 
direction of his work from legislative interference. 
 
4. Ireland 
 
Rogan, M. (2009). Visiting Committees and 
Accountability in the Irish Prison System:  Some 
Proposals for Reform. 31 Dublin University Law 
Journal 208 (2009).  
 
This article discusses Ireland‘s use of ―Visiting 
Committees‖ to monitor conditions in each prison 
facility.  These committees, comprised by appointed 
citizens, conduct regular inspections and receive 
complaints from prisoners.  The Visiting Committee of 
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each facility publishes an annual report that is 
presented to the Minister of Justice.  The author 
identifies shortcomings in the work of the Visiting 
Committees and notes that its independence from the 
prison authorities is subject to debate.  She criticizes 
Ireland‘s lack of an Ombudsman to serve as an 
independent complaints mechanism for prisoners 
similar to what Great Britain has, as well as the 
absence of a statutory body to investigate deaths while 
in custody.  She further notes that while Ireland has an 
Office of the Inspector of Prisons, that office is charged 
only with handling systemic investigations rather than 
addressing individual concerns.  She offers a variety of 
proposals for enhancing accountability in the Irish 
prison system.  
 
5. Latin America 
 
Ungar, M. (2003). Prisons and politics in contemporary 
Latin America. 25 Human Rights Quarterly 909-34 
(2003).  
 
Ungar reviews the current state of Latin American 
prisons, including human rights abuses, attempts at 
reform, and political and administrative obstacles in the 
way of such reform efforts.  He maintains that 
overcrowding, lack of funding, delayed detainee 
processing, and political manipulation of crime issues 
contribute to a systematic failure in protecting 
prisoners‘ human rights.  In addressing reform 
measures, he mentions reducing overcrowding through 
conditional release and alternative sentencing, 
strengthening legal defense agencies, privatization, and 
altering penal process codes.  Of particular interest is 
the author‘s description of the Defensoría del Pueblo, an 
independent national ombudsman‘s office that has been 
created in eleven different Latin America states.  Ungar 
explains that the Defensorías investigate human rights 
abuses, take citizen complaints, initiate legal action, 
and formulate policy.  He notes that while they have no 
specific power in the penal process, they have been 
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successful in exposing inadequate prison conditions in 
certain states. 
 
6. New Zealand 
 
Belgrave, J. ―The Ombudsmen in the Prisons—The New 
Zealand Experience.‖ Address to the 2nd 
Australasian Conference for Correctional 
Inspectors, 2006.  Retrieved May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.custodialinspector.wa.gov.au/go/publi
cations-and-resources/conference-papers 
 
This PowerPoint presentation at a conference of prison 
monitors in Australia and New Zealand provides an 
overview of the work of the New Zealand Ombudsman.  
While the Ombudsman‘s office has responsibility for 
complaints from all government agencies, the office 
contains four specialist investigators who work on 
prison-related issues and visit each prison facility about 
nine times per year.  The office handles minor 
complaints, and also monitors the prison agency‘s 
investigations of serious incidents and deaths in 
custody.  Importantly, the Ombudsman also has the 
power to investigate systemic issues and the paper 
describes various examples of the kinds of major issues 
that have been investigated.  The Ombudsman reports 
directly to Parliament.   
 
7. Poland 
 
Walmsley, R. (1996). ―Inspection‖ and ―Relations with 
non-governmental organizations‖. In Prison 
Systems in Central and Eastern Europe:  Progress, 
problems, and the international standards (pp. 
318-319). Publication series no. 29. Helsinki, 
Finland: European Institute for Crime Prevention 
and Control, affiliated with the United Nations.  
 
These sections of the larger publication describe the 
work of the Polish prison service and, in particular, the 
inspection department charged with visiting regional 
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prisons, and emphasizes the importance of interviewing 
inmates to determine the atmosphere of the prison.  To 
accommodate the difficulty in changing prison 
environments, the inspection department gives 
governors time limits for the implementation of each 
recommendation, and sends follow-up teams to ensure 
changes are implemented.  In ―Relations with non-
governmental organizations,‖ the author notes that the 
inspection department uses strong relationships with 
the Helsinki Committee, the Ombudsman‘s Office, and 
NGOs responsible for ex-offender reentry to identify 
issues of concern. 
 
8. Sweden 
 
Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsman, 
http://www.jo.se/Page.aspx?Language=en (also see 
Nordenfelt, C. (2006). ―The Swedish Parliamentary 
Ombudsman.‖ Handout from the conference 
―Opening Up a Closed World:  What Constitutes 
Effective Prison Oversight?‖).  
 
This website describes the operations of the 
Parliamentary Ombudsman, an office with a Chief and 
three Deputy Ombudsmen, including one dedicated to 
prison-related matters.  The Ombudsmen are elected by 
the Swedish Parliament to ensure that public 
authorities and their staff comply with the laws and 
human rights standards.  The Ombudsmen have 
significant powers to address deficiencies, including the 
ability to act as a special prosecutor in extreme cases. 
 
9. South Africa 
 
Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative (2009).  
Roundtable discussion on oversight over the prison 
system. Retrieved May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/clc-
projects/civil-society-prison-reform-initiative/ 
publications-1/cspri-publications/Oversight%2 
0over %20prison%20system.pdf/ 
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This report of a roundtable discussion about prison 
oversight in South Africa outlines the responsibilities of 
various oversight bodies, including a Parliamentary 
committee on correctional services, the Judicial 
Inspectorate for Prisons, the South African Human 
Rights Commission, NGOs, and the media.  Discussion 
focused on the priorities and challenges faced by of each 
entity and the interaction among the oversight bodies.  
The outcome of the meeting was an identification of key 
correctional issues in need of reform and a commitment 
to working more collaboratively to ensuring more 
accountability in the performance of the prison agency. 
 
Dissel, A. (2003, November). A review of civilian 
oversight over correctional services in the last 
decade. South Africa: Civil Society Prison Reform 
Initiative. Retrieved May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/clc-
projects/civil-society-prison-reform-
initiative/publications-1/cspri-publications/ 
Oversight_corrections_No_4.pdf/ 
 
Ten years after South Africa‘s governmental transition, 
which included the creation of civilian oversight 
mechanisms to enhance accountability and 
transparency of public institutions, this review set out 
to evaluate how well the correctional oversight 
mechanisms were functioning.  The paper outlines 
several of the oversight mechanisms with responsibility 
for prisons, and makes recommendations for 
strengthening their impact. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31
1718 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:5 
Gallinetti, J. (2004, May). Report on the Evaluation of the 
Independent Prison Visitors System (IPV). South 
Africa: Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative. 
Retrieved May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/clc-
projects/civil-society-prison-reform-
initiative/publications-1/cspri-submissions-and-
presentations/040811ipvreport%20csc%20jacque%
20may%202004.pdf/?searchterm=Gallinetti 
 
This report is part of an overall review of civilian 
correctional oversight mechanisms in South Africa with 
a focus on the Independent Prison Visitors System 
(IPV).  Independent Prison Visitors are appointed by the 
Inspecting Judge to deal with prisoner complaints and 
provide a mechanism that allows for community 
involvement in the prison system.  The report evaluates 
almost every aspect of the IPV, including its functions, 
duties, and powers.  Additionally, the report assesses 
the IPV‘s relationship with the Judicial Inspectorate of 
Prisons in South Africa, another oversight body, and 
with correctional department staff.  The research was 
not intended to evaluate individual IPVs but rather to 
evaluate the system more generally.  The report 
describes the IPV system as an ―overwhelming success,‖ 
though it offers several recommendations for enhancing 
its effectiveness.   
 
Jagwanth, S. (2004, May). A Review of the Judicial 
Inspectorate of Prisons of South Africa. South 
Africa: Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative. 
Retrieved May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/clc-
projects/civil-society-prison-reform-
initiative/publications-1/cspri-
publications/Judicial_Inspectorate_Report_No_7.
pdf/ 
 
As part of a large comprehensive review of the 
correctional oversight mechanisms in place in South 
African, academics from the CSPRI developed this 
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report with a focus on the Judicial Inspectorate of 
Prisons, one of the key oversight structures in place to 
address concerns about the human rights of prisoners.  
While the oversight mechanism is seen as important 
and as having contributed to correctional reforms, the 
report also details some concerns about the effectiveness 
of the oversight structure.  The author provides 
information about oversight structures in other 
countries and the report ends with a series of 
recommendations.   
 
10. United Kingdom 
 
HM Inspectorate of Prisons (2009). Expectations: 
Criteria for assessing the conditions in prison and 
the treatment of prisoners (3rd ed.). Retrieved on 
May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/inspectorates/hmi-
prisons/docs/expectations_2009.pdf 
 
This document sets forth the criteria used by the British 
Inspector of Prisons to evaluate prison conditions during 
inspections.  The criteria draw on international human 
rights standards and they adopt a holistic approach to 
assessing prison conditions and determining whether a 
prison is ―healthy.‖  The Inspectorate uses four tests to 
assess the health of a custodial environment: (1) that 
prisoners are held in safety; (2) that they are treated 
with respect as humans; (3) that prisoners engage in 
purposeful activity; and (4) that they are prepared for a 
return to the community. These criteria provide the 
basis for robust, independent, and evidence-based 
assessment of prison conditions and the treatment of 
prisoners.  
 
Independent Monitoring Boards. Retrieved on May 20, 
2010, from http://www.imb.gov.uk/ 
 
Independent Monitoring Boards (―IMBs,‖ formerly 
known as Boards of Visitors) are one of the three forms 
of external review of prison conditions in England and 
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Wales.  IMBs consist of lay citizens who volunteer on an 
unpaid basis to monitor local prisons on a day-to-day 
basis and members of the IMB are appointed by the 
British Home Secretary.  Each prison has its own IMB.  
After receiving training, these citizen volunteers have 
unfettered access to the prison, make routine 
inspections, interview prisoners to ensure that prison 
conditions are being maintained at an adequate level, 
and handle prisoner complaints. The position is open to 
any citizen who chooses to apply and is approved after 
an interview, and the IMBs are intended to be 
representative of the community.  Each IMB issues an 
annual report about the prison it monitors. 
 
Mordaunt, E.  (2000).  ―The Emergence of Multi-
Inspectorate Inspections:  ‗Going it Alone is not 
an Option.‖ 78  Public Administration 751-69 
(2000). 
 
Based on a comparative study of four British 
inspectorates, Mordaunt develops a typology for prison 
inspections (single institutional inspections, multi-
service inspections, thematic inspections, survey 
inspections, monitoring reviews).  He then focuses 
specifically on the multi-inspectorate approach, 
describing it as a current development that is likely to 
have a significant impact on oversight practices.  
Mordaunt describes two specific multi-inspectorate 
models.  The first include Joint Reviews that explore 
quality, effectiveness, and financial efficiency.  The 
second example is the joint inspection between the HM 
Inspectorate of Prisons and the HM Inspectorate of 
Parole.  The article closes with a number of issues that 
Mordaunt argues must be taken into consideration 
before such approaches can be effective. 
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Owers, A. (Feb. 9th, 2006). ―Submission to Vera 
Commission.‖ 22 Washington University Journal 
of Law & Policy 231 (2006). Retrieved on May 20, 
2010 from: 
http://law.wustl.edu/Journal/22/p231Owers.pdf 
 
This article provides the most useful and readily 
available description of the structure of the British 
Prison Inspectorate.  As Her Majesty‘s Chief Inspector 
of Prisons for England and Wales, Anne Owers 
discusses the role of the inspectorate and the agency‘s 
methodology, as well as the importance of independent 
scrutiny in ensuring humane conditions and treatment 
of prisoners.  She views the Inspectorate‘s oversight role 
as preventative in nature.  Owers describes the schedule 
and format of inspections and the reports the 
Inspectorate issues, and assesses the influence the 
Inspectorate has had.  She stresses that different 
contexts require different systems and notes that this 
particular model of oversight may not necessarily be 
ideal for other countries, though the methods, tests, and 
criteria the Inspectorate uses can surely be adapted by 
others seeking to take on monitoring responsibilities.  
 
Owers, A. (2004, December 9). Rights behind bars: The 
conditions and treatment of those in prison. 
Speech presented at The International Human 
Rights Day Lecture, The Centre for the Study 
Human Rights. Retrieved May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/humanRights/arti
clesAndTranscripts/Rights_behind_bars.pdf 
 
Anne Owers, HM Chief Inspector of Prisons for England 
and Wales, delivers a speech that focuses on three main 
themes: human rights in a prison context, the 
importance of independent prison inspections as a 
human rights mechanism, and reactions to proposed 
restructured forms of public service inspectors.  Owers 
uses examples from her inspections to reveal how prison 
environments are inherently dangerous to the fostering 
of human rights.  She then explains how independent 
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inspectors impact human rights conditions in prisons 
and places of detention and how their inspections differ 
from internal reviews of efficiency or adherence to 
standards.  The speech outlines four principles for 
inspections: (1) focusing their scale and scope on places 
of detention, (2) empowering the Chief Inspector so that 
he or she has the flexibility and resources to inspect any 
prison at any time, (3) reporting directly to the Minister 
and public, and (4) maintaining a distinction between 
inspecting prison environments and the monitoring of 
prison services.  Owers then offers her perspective on 
recent attempts to consolidate prison inspection 
mechanisms with probation inspectorates and criminal 
justice system inspectorates.  
 
 
Owers, A. (2003, October 22). Prisons Inspection and the 
Protection of Human Rights. Speech presented at 
The British Institute of Human Rights Lunchtime 
Lecture. Retrieved May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.bihr.org.uk/documents/lunchtime-
lectures/prisons-inspection-and-the-protection-of-
human-rights 
 
HM Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales, 
Anne Owers, explains how prison inspections can help 
monitor, prevent, and disclose human rights concerns.  
She argues that the first two tests of the Prisons 
Inspectorate ‗Healthy Prisons‘ concept—safety and 
respect—constitute the bottom line of any custodial 
environment.  She differentiates between the types of 
oversight provided by the citizen volunteers of the 
Independent Monitoring Boards who visit prison 
facilities on a daily basis and the detailed scrutiny 
provided by specialists from the Inspectorate working 
on-site for an entire week.  Fearing changes to the 
inspectorate system, the Chief Inspector concludes with 
four elements that she believes are essential to an 
effective inspectorate, including the use of independent 
monitoring criteria; frequent inspections on a set 
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schedule; the ability to conduct unannounced 
inspections; and meaningful independence. 
 
Prisons and Probation Ombudsman for England and 
Wales. Website:  http://www.ppo.gov.uk/about-
us.html 
 
This website describes the work of the Ombudsman‘s 
office, which handles individual complaints from 
prisoners, probationers, and immigrant detainees, and 
also investigates deaths in custody.  The Ombudsman is 
one of the key oversight bodies in the UK, along with 
the Prisons Inspectorate and the Independent 
Monitoring Boards.  The website contains Annual 
Reports and other official documents, as well as an 
interesting protocol detailing the working arrangements 
between the Ombudsman and the Inspectorate.  The 
latter (available at: 
http://www.ppo.gov.uk/docs/protocol_working_arrrange
ments_between_hmcip_ppo.pdf) could be helpful for 
oversight bodies in other jurisdictions seeking to 
coordinate their oversight responsibilities with another 
entity.   
 
Ramsbotham, D. (2005). Prisongate: The Shocking State 
of Britain’s Prisons and the Need for Visionary 
Change, London: Free Press – Simon and 
Schuster.  
 
This book is an account of David Ramsbotham‘s tenure 
as Chief Inspector of Prisons in the United Kingdom.  
As he writes about his experiences in this office, he 
introduces the reader to some of the difficulties 
confronted, including bad prison conditions, a lack of 
funding, and poor management.  He also discusses his 
perspective on his office‘s role, as well as the role of 
prison oversight in general, noting that quality 
assurance is one of the critical values that independent 
inspection contributes to the conduct of imprisonment. 
He laments the fact that prisons are not working as well 
as they should, something he finds regrettable since 
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most prisoners will be released from prison.  He ends 
with his recommendations on how to improve the 
British penal system.  
 
C. Country Comparisons  
 
Casale, S., Chunn, G. C., & Dickey, W. (Feb. 8th, 2006). 
Transparency in American Corrections Panel. 
Transcript of Proceedings from Commssion on 
Safety and Abuse in America‘s Prisons – 4th 
Hearing.  Retrieved February 8, 2010, from 
http://www.prisoncommission.org/public_hearing_
4.asp 
 
The panel discussed transparency in American prisons, 
especially as compared to certain European countries 
operating within the jurisdiction of the Committee for 
the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CPT). Panelists discussed 
whether an approach similar to the CPT would be 
effective or viable in the United States. They also 
addressed how oversight is best initiated through 
forming a partnership with penal institutions, as well as 
emphasizing that successful oversight not only involves 
criticism of bad practices, but also praise for positive 
practices.  
 
Deitch, M. (2005). Why You Should Love Watchdogs: The 
Case for Effective Prison Oversight and the 
British Experience. XVII (3) Correctional Law 
Reporter, Oct./Nov., 40-42, 46-47. 
 
Deitch begins with a discussion of the meaning of prison 
oversight, emphasizing three key factors: (1) the 
oversight body is external to the agency being reviewed; 
(2) the focus of the oversight body is not on compliance 
with rules and standards but rather on the treatment of 
prisoners; and (3) the oversight is routine and designed 
to prevent problems, rather than designed to investigate 
problems after they have occurred.  Although she notes 
that such types of oversight are generally lacking in the 
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current American system, Britain already has such a 
correctional oversight system in place and Deitch 
describes the British oversight structure.  She also 
highlights the benefits that such oversight provides for 
corrections officials. 
 
Hood, C., James, O., Peters, B.G., & Scott, C. (Eds.) 
(2004). Controlling Modern Government: Variety, 
Commonality and Change. Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar. 
 
A significant portion of this book is devoted to 
examining the prison systems in eight different 
countries: Australia, France, Germany, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, England and Wales, and the 
United States.  The authors note that there has been 
little growth in prison oversight in these nations since 
the mid-1970s, despite the fact that the prison 
population has exploded during this time.  The book 
provides a detailed analysis of the oversight 
mechanisms present in each of these eight countries.  
The section on the U.S. focuses primarily on the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons rather than on state prison systems.  
 
Maguire, M., Vagg, J., & Morgan, R. (Eds.). (1985). 
Accountability and prisons: Opening up a closed 
world. London: Tavistock Publications.  
 
Although somewhat dated, this book provides an 
impressive collection of essays exploring various 
mechanisms for instituting prison oversight, including 
the creation of standards, independent inspections, 
ombudsmen, grievance procedures, and internal 
management techniques.  The last section compares 
three countries‘ oversight mechanisms: the Netherlands‘ 
grievance procedures, Canada‘s disciplinary review 
mechanisms, and the United States‘ judicial 
intervention to address poor prison conditions. 
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Mariner, J. (2002). Behind Bars in America. 29 (2) 
Human Rights 9-10 (Spring 2002). 
 
Mariner focuses on the lack of prison and jail oversight 
in the United States in terms of its impact upon the 
human rights of prisoners.  In particular, she comments 
on the disparity between the effective monitoring that 
takes place overseas, as compared to the lack of it 
within the United States.  
 
Stern, V. (1998). Keeping the rules: The supervisors and 
the inspectors. In A sin against the future: 
Imprisonment in the World (pp. 225-247). Boston: 
Northeastern University Press.  
 
Stern reviews a variety of prison oversight mechanisms 
including boards of visitors (U.K.), judges (France and 
Europe), public prosecutors (East and Central Europe, 
China), courts (U.S.), and ombudsmen (U.K.), and 
discusses the relative strengths and weaknesses of each 
approach.  She also describes international mechanisms, 
such as the European Commission and the Court for 
Human Rights, and the U.N. Human Rights Committee 
and the Commission on Human Rights.  Finally, she 
discusses the role of national inspectors, such as the 
Prisons Inspectorate of England and Wales, and 
international inspectors such as CPT and NGOs. 
 
Walmsley, R. (1996). Inspection and the protection of the 
rights of prisoners (EPR rules 4 and 5). In Prison 
systems in Central and Eastern Europe: Progress, 
problems and the international standards (pp. 48-
53). Publication series no. 29. Helsinki, Finland: 
European Institute for Crime Prevention and 
Control, affiliated with the United Nations.  
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Walmsley describes the European Prison Rules (EPR) 
relevant to inspections (rules 4 and 5) and evaluates 
individual countries‘ methods of complying with them.  
He creates a table that indicates for each country 
whether each of the following bodies conducts prison 
inspections:  the prison administration, the responsible 
ministry (e.g., Ministry of Justice or Internal Affairs), or 
an independent official body (e.g., prosecutor or 
parliamentary body).  He notes that while all the 
countries offer some form of inspection to comply with 
the EPR, differences remain among the types of bodies 
employed by each nation and the level of development of 
such roles.  In addition, most countries have an 
independent inspector, which is usually the prosecutor‘s 
office.  Certain complications arise, however, regarding 
the possible conflict in simultaneously prosecuting the 
accused and examining conditions of detention.  Finally, 
the author describes legislative and non-governmental 
oversight. 
 
III. Models of Oversight in the United States 
 
A. Independent Oversight Generally 
 
Beck, J., Hall-Martinez, K., Smith, A. S., & Walker, L. 
(2006, February 9). Beyond Government Oversight 
Panel.  Transcript of Proceedings from 
Commission on Safety and Abuse in America‘s 
Prisons – 4th Hearing.  Retrieved on May 20, 2010, 
from http://www.prisoncommission.org/ 
public_hearing_4.asp 
 
The primary topic of the panel involved the role of non-
governmental actors and organizations in prison 
oversight.  Speakers from various organizations, such as 
Stop Prisoner Rape, the Correctional Association of New 
York‘s Prison Visiting Project, and the Massachusetts 
Correctional Legal Services‘ Rapid Response to 
Brutality Project expressed their perspectives on the 
role of NGOs in correctional oversight.  Both 
transparency and accountability of prisons for the 
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protection of prisoners‘ rights was a central concern of 
the speakers.  
 
Cate, M., Deitch, M., & Yeomans, W. (2006, February 8). 
Government Oversight of Prisons and Jails Panel. 
Transcript of Proceedings from Commission on 
Safety and Abuse in America‘s Prisons – 4th 
Hearing. Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.prisoncommission.org/public_hearing_
4.asp  
 
Panelists covered different aspects of prison and jail 
oversight.  Topics ranged from discussing the key 
elements of effective oversight to particular examples of 
federal and state oversight.  Particular emphasis was 
placed on the need for oversight findings to be made 
public, thereby increasing public involvement in the 
process.  
 
Chunn, G. (Feb. 8th, 2006). Testimony for the Hearing of 
the Commission on Safety and Abuse in America‘s 
Prisons. Written Testimony Submitted to the 
Commission on Safety and Abuse in America‘s 
Prisons – 4th Hearing.  Retrieved on May 20, 2010, 
from http://www.prisoncommission.org/ 
statements/chunn_gwendolyn_c.pdf   
 
Chunn provides a general history and overview of the 
American Correctional Association (ACA). Also 
discussed within the statement are the certification and 
training opportunities available to prison staff and 
officials who are members of the ACA.  
 
Commission on Safety and Abuse in America‘s Prisons 
(2006). Confronting Confinement.  Vera Institute 
of Justice.  Retrieved May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.prisoncommission.org/pdfs/Confrontin
g_Confinement.pdf 
 
One section of this comprehensive report on conditions 
in America‘s prisons deals with oversight and 
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accountability issues.  The report recommends the 
development of independent government correctional 
oversight mechanisms, as well as the creation of a 
national non-governmental body with the expertise to 
inspect facilities at the invitation of correctional 
administrators.  The report further recommends 
strengthening accountability within the correctional 
profession, educating and involving the public with 
regard to prison conditions, and reinvigorating 
investigation and enforcement mechanisms for abuses of 
prisoners.  The findings and recommendations of this 
commission grew out of four hearings held around the 
country at which a wide variety of domestic and 
international experts addressed the commission 
members. 
 
Deitch, M. (2010). Independent Correctional Oversight 
Mechanisms Across the United States: A 50-State 
Inventory.  30 Pace Law Review 1754 (2010).  
www.law.pace.edu/plr 
 
This massive report seeks to identify every independent 
correctional oversight body in the United States, and 
provides contact information and a short description of 
each of these entities.  It is the most comprehensive 
such listing available and also provides charts that 
visually depict the types of oversight that exist in each 
state.  The report provides a baseline against which 
each jurisdiction can assess the extent of correctional 
oversight in that jurisdiction.  It also provides a quick 
reference guide for those stakeholders interested in a 
variety of models of prison and jail oversight, and shows 
major gaps in the systems in the United States for 
monitoring prison and jail conditions and the treatment 
of prisoners.  Although the report is thick with examples 
of entities that perform (or have the authority to 
perform) some kind of oversight function, a close 
examination of these descriptions reveals that formal 
and comprehensive external oversight—in the form of 
inspections and routine monitoring of conditions that 
affect the rights of prisoners—is truly rare in the United 
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States.  Even more elusive are forms of oversight that 
seek to promote both public transparency of correctional 
institutions and accountability for the protection of 
human rights.  The work is intended to spark discussion 
and debate regarding the extent of prison oversight in 
the United States and to stimulate creative thinking 
about the ways that oversight bodies can be structured. 
 
B. The Use of Litigation 
 
Bronstein, A., Hanlon, S., & Thompson, M. (2006, 
February 9). Litigation as Oversight Panel. 
Transcript of Proceedings from Commission on 
Safety and Abuse in America‘s Prisons – 4th 
Hearing. Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.prisoncommission.org/public_hearing_
4.asp   
 
This panel discussion addressed the ways that litigation 
and court intervention can protect prisoners‘ rights.  
Panelists included Alvin Bronstein, Director Emeritus 
of the National Prison Project, who spoke about how 
court-ordered monitoring has historically been the 
principal form of correctional oversight in the U.S.; 
Stephen Hanlon, a lawyer in numerous prison class 
action lawsuits, who focused on the negative impacts of 
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) on the ability 
of courts to protect prisoners; and Federal District 
Judge Myron Thompson, who discussed the role that 
judges, through the sentencing mechanism, can play in 
prison oversight.  Panelists generally agreed that 
litigation had provided for successful oversight in many 
instances, but all agreed that the PLRA had hampered 
more recent attempts to achieve oversight through 
litigation.  
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Bronstein, A.J. (2006, February 9). The Role of Litigation 
in Correctional Oversight. Written Testimony 
Submitted to the Commission on Safety and 
Abuse in America‘s Prisons – 4th Hearing. 
Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/bro
nstein_alvin_j.pdf 
 
Alvin Bronstein traces the rise and fall of litigation as a 
means of correctional oversight in the United States, 
from the hands-off approach of the courts in the 19th 
century, to the active involvement of the courts in the 
late 20th century, until the passage of the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act in 1996, which decreased the 
frequency and efficacy of litigation as a means to 
address human rights violations in prisons. Bronstein 
concludes by advocating for a human rights approach to 
the problems of crime and imprisonment.  
 
Hanlon, S.F. (2006, February 9). Written Remarks. 
Written Testimony Submitted to the Commission 
on Safety and Abuse in America‘s Prisons – 4th 
Hearing. Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from  
http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/hanl
on_stephen_f.pdf 
 
Stephen Hanlon‘s remarks trace recent Supreme Court 
case law in prison litigation, as well as explain the 
impact of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). He 
comments that these legal developments have made it 
increasingly difficult for prisoners to litigate issues, 
partly because case law has imposed significant burdens 
of proof upon plaintiffs, and in part because the PLRA 
can often make it difficult for plaintiff attorneys to 
recover legal fees in prison litigation. 
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Symposium. Prison Reform Revisited: The Unfinished 
Agenda [Special issue]. 24 (2) Pace Law Review 
(2004). Individual papers from this volume are 
available online.  Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from 
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/ 
lawrev/index.2.html 
 
This important volume contains numerous papers 
presented at a conference on prison reform litigation.  
The invitation-only conference included participants 
from all stakeholder groups, including prison officials, 
attorneys, advocates, judges, lawmakers, and scholars.  
The papers address topics such as the accomplishments 
and failures of litigation, the modern American penal 
system, the anatomy of a prisoner‘s rights lawsuit, the 
international context of U.S. prison reform, and the 
future of reform efforts.  This conference, held at Pace 
Law School in 2004, was the precursor to the Texas 
conference on prison oversight in 2006. 
 
Thompson, M.H. (2006, February 9). Written Statement. 
Written Testimony Submitted to the Commission 
on Safety and Abuse in America‘s Prisons – 4th 
Hearing. Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/tho
mpson_myron_h.pdf 
 
Judge Myron Thompson begins by observing that it is a 
state‘s responsibility to ensure that prison conditions 
meet constitutional standards—not the responsibility of 
the federal government, and not the responsibility of 
federal judges.  Thus courts should only intervene when 
states fail to fulfill the obligation to fix constitutional 
violations.  Consequently, judicial oversight of prisons is 
limited in that it is purely reactionary in nature, and 
not preventative.  Moreover, judicial oversight can only 
look to the floor of what is required by the constitution.  
Thus, it is a mistake to look to court oversight as a 
means of significant prison reform. 
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Yeomans, W. (2006, February 9). Statement. Written 
Testimony Submitted to the Commission on 
Safety and Abuse in America‘s Prisons – 4th 
Hearing.  Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/yeo
mans_william.pdf 
 
William Yeomans discusses the role of the Civil Rights 
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice in 
investigating prison abuses, misconduct, and 
unconstitutional conditions, and in enforcing 
constitutional requirements with regard to correctional 
facilities.  Among the tools available to the Justice 
Department are criminal and civil proceedings and the 
option to negotiate settlement agreements with 
correctional administrators that can be monitored by 
Justice Department officials.  He also calls for 
Congressional review of the Civil Rights Division, in 
order to ensure that it continues to strongly enforce 
federal law and constitutional norms. 
 
C. Federal System 
 
Fine, G. (2005, April 19). Statement. Written Testimony 
Submitted to the Commission on Safety and 
Abuse in America‘s Prisons – 1st Hearing. 
Retrieved on February 8, 2010, from 
http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/fine
_glenn.pdf 
 
As Inspector General for the U.S. Department of Justice 
(which includes the Federal Bureau of Prisons), Fine 
explains that a portion of his office‘s responsibilities 
includes investigating, auditing, and inspecting prisons, 
especially in response to allegations of misconduct by 
prison officials.  Fine‘s testimony provides background 
about the structure and authority of the OIG, as well as 
statistics about prison abuse investigations and 
descriptions of some systemic reviews conducted by the 
office on issues relevant to prisoner abuse.  The 
Inspector General, who is selected by the President and 
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confirmed by the Senate, reports to Congress and the 
U.S. Attorney General, and is granted subpoena power 
and access to government files.  Fine believes that a 
system similar to his office, one that is well-funded and 
fully independent, is critical to deter prison abuse from 
occurring.   
 
D. Specific States’ Models 
 
1. California 
 
Bobb, M. (2006, February 9). Statement. Written 
Testimony Submitted to the Commission on 
Safety and Abuse in America‘s Prisons – 4th 
Hearing. Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/bob
b_merrick.pdf 
 
In his role as Special Counsel to the Los Angeles County 
Board of Supervisors, Bobb monitors the Los Angeles 
County jails.  He discusses different jurisdictions‘ efforts 
to incorporate civilian oversight of misconduct in these 
jails, for example, through Seattle‘s use of a civilian 
lawyer to head the Internal Affairs unit, to the Office of 
Independent Review in Los Angeles, and finally, San 
Francisco‘s utilization of a citizen‘s review board.  He 
ends by advocating for an oversight system similar to 
Seattle‘s and the Office of Independent Review, 
specifically one that promotes internal accountability 
while still ensuring a failsafe against biased and 
incompetent investigations through the use of civilian 
oversight groups.  
 
Cate, M. (Feb. 8th, 2006). Letter to Prison Commission. 
Written Testimony Submitted to the Commission 
on Safety and Abuse in America‘s Prisons – 4th 
Hearing. Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/cate
_matthew.pdf   
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Then-California Inspector General Matthew Cate 
describes California‘s model for providing prison 
oversight.  The California OIG is an independent agency 
with the mandate to inspect prison facilities for adults 
and juveniles and to investigate incidents of abuse.  
Since 2005, the OIG has had the ability to release its 
findings publicly, and Cate believes that this model has 
helped achieve positive results within the California 
prisons and enhance public confidence. 
 
Gennaco, M. (2005).  Toward Increased Transparency in 
the Jails and Prisons: Some Optimistic Signs. 
Written Testimony Submitted to the Commission 
on Safety and Abuse in America‘s Prisons – 1st 
Hearing. Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/gen
naco_mike.pdf 
 
Michael Gennaco heads the Office of Independent 
Review, the civilian oversight agency that monitors the 
Los Angeles County Sheriff‘s Department to ensure that 
allegations of officer misconduct are investigated fairly 
and adequately.  His testimony describes the 
involvement of the OIR in certain investigations and he 
notes that the agency can investigate and report on 
critical incidents in the jail allegations against the 
department at the same time that internal 
investigations are proceeding.  The OIR is free to reach 
its own conclusions, as well as to challenge the Sheriff‘s 
Department on certain practices or incidents.  Gennaco 
observes that internal tracking mechanisms regarding 
patterns of misconduct on the part of jail staff lag far 
behind similar tracking systems for police departments.  
He also stresses the importance of correctional facilities‘ 
allowing public access and routine monitoring visits by 
advocacy groups.  
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2. Illinois 
 
Young, M. (2006). The Promise and Challenge of Citizen 
Oversight and Visits to Prison. Written statement 
to the Commission on Safety and Abuse in 
America‘s Prisons—4th Hearing. Retrieved on May 
20, 2010, from 
http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/you
ng_malcom.pdf 
 
Malcolm Young, the Executive Director of the John 
Howard Association, a citizen oversight group that has 
monitored conditions in Illinois prisons since 1901, 
provides an overview of citizen oversight of corrections. 
He provides an historical overview of the work of the 
John Howard Association and notes that the 
organization‘s prison visiting program currently brings 
over a thousand citizen volunteers a year into the state‘s 
prisons, jails, and juvenile detention facilities.  Access is 
at the discretion of the prison agency.  Observing that 
funding issues are directly related to the independence 
of the oversight mechanism, Young addresses the 
important issue of how such citizen oversight should be 
financially supported and discusses the pros and cons of 
oversight bodies receiving grant funding, consulting 
fees, and government support.  
 
3. Massachusetts 
 
Department of Correction Advisory Council.  (2005, 
October 25).  The Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
Department of Correction Advisory Council Final 
Report.  Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.mass.gov/Eeops/docs/doc/doc_final_rep
ort.pdf 
 
The Department of Correction Advisory Council (DCAC) 
of Massachusetts was formed in 2004 to establish a plan 
for reducing the rate of re-offense among inmates.  
Toward this end, the DCAC performed a thorough audit 
of the Massachusetts prison system, and issued this 
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report that makes a number of recommendations aimed 
at improving accountability, ensuring fairness, and 
fostering fiscal accountability.  The report also draws 
heavily on the earlier findings of the Governor‘s 
Commission on Corrections Reform.  Among its 
recommendations is the appointment of an Independent 
Inspector General who would be fully independent of 
the state prison system.  The DCAC report argues that 
an Inspector General would be uniquely equipped to 
discern legitimate grievances from mere rhetoric, 
reinforcing the state where it is right and holding it 
accountable where it is wrong.  The document also 
addresses concerns associated with any infringement 
that an Inspector General may have on prison security. 
 
Harshbarger, S. (2006, February 9). Implementing 
Corrections Reform: A Major Public Safety 
Challenge and Opportunity. Written Testimony 
Submitted to the Commission on Safety and 
Abuse in America‘s Prisons – 4th Hearing. 
Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/hars
hbarger_scott.pdf 
 
In his role as Chair of the Governor‘s Commission for 
Corrections Reform in Massachusetts, Scott 
Harshbarger discusses the Commission‘s role in 
monitoring the state‘s Department of Corrections.  
Although acknowledging that independent oversight is a 
critical component of a properly run prison system, he 
also emphasizes that in order to function properly, the 
system needs effective leadership and administration, 
as well as support from the executive and legislative 
branches.  He identifies the role that such an 
independent oversight body should play within a state 
system, especially in terms of its interaction with other 
state bodies, and notes that the Commission called for 
the appointment of an inspector general and enhanced 
external oversight of corrections in Massachusetts. 
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4. New York 
 
Beck, J. (2006, February 9). Testimony. Written 
Testimony Submitted to the Commission on 
Safety and Abuse in America‘s Prisons – 4th 
Hearing.  Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/beck
_jack.pdf 
 
The Correctional Association of New York is one of only 
two non-governmental organizations in the United 
States that enjoy legislative authority to access prisons 
and to issue public reports on their findings.  Jack Beck, 
the director of the Prison Visiting Project of the 
Correctional Association of New York, details the 
structure of the organization and gives examples of its 
oversight work.  He also identifies a number of factors 
that are crucial to any outside organization that 
monitors and inspects prisons, including independence, 
access to information, and the ability to make reports 
available to the public.  
 
Beck, J. (2007, December 6). Testimony before the 
National Prison Rape Elimination Commission. 
Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/nprec/
20090820160927/http://nprec.us/docs3/Beck%20Test
imony.pdf 
 
Beck‘s testimony before the National Prison Rape 
Elimination Commission details the unique opportunity 
that the Correctional Association of New York has in 
monitoring New York‘s prisons.  He discusses the 
challenges faced by outside agencies that monitor issues 
of sexual misconduct and identifies the key factors that 
make an oversight body effective. 
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Correctional Association of New York.  (2005).  State of 
the prisons 2002-2003:  Conditions of confinement 
in 14 New York state correctional facilities.  New 
York:  Correctional Association of New York. 
Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.correctionalassociation.org/publicatio
ns/download/pvp/State_of_prisons_02-03.pdf 
 
The Correction Association describes its typical prison 
visit.  Typically, five to eight inspection team members 
visit facilities‘ cellblocks and dormitories, yard, medical 
clinic, classrooms, and activity areas.  Two staff 
members are also allowed to interview inmates in 
solitary Special Housing Units.  They also meet with an 
Inmate Liaison Committee, as well as with corrections 
administrators and staff.  The report also describes the 
types of questionnaires that the researchers use. 
 
5. Ohio 
 
Pope, S. (2006).  The Work of the Ohio Correctional 
Institution Inspection Committee: Reflections and 
Analysis. Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.ciic.state.oh.us/reports/randa3-16-
06.pdf 
 
This detailed description and analysis of the operations 
of Ohio‘s Correctional Institution Inspection Committee 
(CIIC) was presented at the Texas conference entitled 
―Opening Up a Closed World: What Constitutes 
Effective Prison Oversight?‖  The CIIC is unique as an 
oversight body in that it is structured as a legislative 
committee yet it conducts routine inspections of prison 
facilities and issues reports on its findings.  The 
committee is comprised of state legislators and a full-
time staff of professional correctional inspectors.   
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6. Pennsylvania 
 
The Pennsylvania Prison Society website. Retrieved on 
May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.prisonsociety.org/adv/ov.shtml 
 
This 200-year old organization advocates for prisoners 
in a variety of ways.  In terms of oversight, it has an 
Officials Visitors program that makes thousands of 
visits to prisoners each year in order to monitor prison 
conditions and assist with individual or systemic prison 
problems.  These visitors are all volunteers and state 
law provides them with authority to carry out these 
visits.   
 
7. Texas 
 
Johnson, G.L. (2006, February 8). Remarks. Written 
Testimony Submitted to the Commission on 
Safety and Abuse in America‘s Prisons – 4th 
Hearing.  Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/john
son_gary.pdf 
 
Gary Johnson, the former director of the Texas prison 
system, comments upon the benefits of oversight, 
specifically, how it prevents complacency on the part of 
prison officials, as well as how it helps maintain rules 
and standards within an institution.  Having lived 
through judicial oversight of Texas prisons during the 
Ruiz case, he discusses the difficult transition period 
during which prison officials gradually became 
accustomed to oversight.  He also addresses the tension 
between the benefits of external oversight and the 
dangers and limitations that such oversight may also 
entail.  Since the termination of court oversight, Texas 
prisons have moved towards developing relationships 
with external accrediting bodies such as the American 
Correctional Association.  Johnson also discusses the 
risks of having oversight responsibilities conducted by 
non-professional entities with advocacy agendas. 
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Reynolds, C. (2004, Spring). Effective self-monitoring of 
correctional conditions. 24 Pace Law Review 769-
792 (2004).  Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from 
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawrev/18/ 
 
Carl Reynolds, then-General Counsel for the Texas 
Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), examines how 
TDCJ developed internal review mechanisms to 
increase the agency‘s accountability and transparency 
following the termination of court oversight in the Ruiz 
case.  The article describes various TDCJ internal 
review methods, including: emergency action center 
daily reports and monthly statistics that list serious and 
unusual events; serious incident, grievance, and use of 
force reviews; operational review and risk management; 
medical monitoring; investigations by an inspector 
general; internal audits; and policy reviews.  Reynolds 
also notes that the agency sought technical assistance 
from the National Institute of Corrections on projects 
regarding administrative segregation and mentally ill 
offenders, as well as on use of force reviews. 
 
 
IV. Oversight of Specific Prison Issues 
 
A. Private Prisons 
 
Aman, A.C. (2005). Privatization, Prisons, Democracy, 
and Human Rights: The Need to Extend the 
Province of Administrative Law. Indiana Journal 
of Global Legal Studies 511-50 (Summer 2002). 
 
Professor Aman focuses upon problems with prison 
privatization, one of which is the failure of most states 
to include human rights provisions in statutes 
authorizing contracts with private prisons.  To remedy 
this ill, Aman recommends the creation of a Model 
Privatization Code that incorporates provisions 
protecting prisoner‘s human rights, as well as fostering 
public participation on this issue.  In order for the 
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government to retain accountability for private prisons, 
Aman also asserts that: (1) the government must have 
the ability to ―step-in‖ and reclaim any portion of a 
privately run prison; and (2) any privatization contract 
must be limited in its duration.  The latter provision 
allows more public input into the privatization process, 
as do a number of other approaches set forth in the 
article.  He also advocates for the creation of inspection 
mechanisms modeled on the British Prison Inspectorate 
and for the application of the Administrative Procedures 
Act to private operators so that private providers will be 
more publicly accountable for ensuring the human 
rights of prisoners.   
 
Bachman, D.D.  (1997).  Monitoring and Accountability.  
Paper presented at the National Workshop on 
Private Prisons, Oklahoma City, November 2-4, 
1997.  Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.doc.state.ok.us/field/private_prisons/m
onitoring_and_accountability.pdf 
 
This paper, available on the website of Oklahoma‘s 
Department of Corrections, discusses the importance of 
an effective monitoring process to ensure accountability 
in the operation of private prisons.  Bachman describes 
how standards must be constructed collaboratively 
between the state and the prison contractor.  The author 
also discusses the strengths and limitations of two 
models of monitor selection: a full-time on-site monitor 
versus an outside agent.  He also notes that a 
combination of the two is used by several agencies.  The 
essay closes with a description of monitoring methods, 
including the scheduling of visits, provisions for written 
reports, corrective plans of action, a mechanism for 
making decisions and resolving disputes, and sanctions 
for non-compliance. 
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Camp, S.D., Gaes, G.G., Klein-Saffran, J., Daggett, D.M., 
& Saylor, W.G.  (2002). ―Using inmate survey data 
in assessing prison performance:  A case study 
comparing private and public prisons.‖  27 (1) 
Criminal Justice Review 26-51 (2002). 
 
The authors demonstrate how surveys of inmates can be 
used to compare the performance of private and public 
prisons with regard to gang management, safety and 
security, sanitation, and food service delivery. They 
argue that surveys should not replace operational 
reviews and audits but should be used in concert with 
such traditional mechanisms.  Such surveys are 
inexpensive to distribute and findings were generally 
similar to the views expressed by guards, if not more 
reliable, indicating that prison staff and administration 
should be receptive to such methodologies for gathering 
information. 
 
Collins, W.  (2000).  Contracting for correctional services 
provided by private firms.  Washington, D.C.:  U.S. 
Department of Justice, 36-42.  Retrieved on May 
20, 2010, from 
http://www.asca.net/documents/contract.pdf 
 
In his discussion of monitoring private prison facilities, 
Collins stresses the need to balance a focus on 
compliance with specific rules with a broader 
understanding of the ―climate‖ of the prison.  He also 
distinguishes between ―quality control,‖ which is a form 
of self-monitoring on the part of private prison 
administrators and ―quality assurance,‖ which is 
executed by the government.  The text also outlines 
several enforcement mechanisms, including corrective 
action plans, liquidated damages, incentive awards, 
dispute resolution, and, if all else fails, actual 
termination of the contract. 
 
Harding, R.W.  (1997).  Private Prisons and Public 
Accountability.  New Brunswick, NJ:  Transaction 
Publishers. 
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Harding outlines a standard for contract monitoring for 
private prisons.  An important step in his model is 
allowing both public and private operators to bid on 
contracts.  This would encourage a cross-fertilized 
system and one in which both public and private 
institutions necessarily functioned under the same 
standards.  This, argues Harding, avoids significant 
disparities in conditions.  Harding acknowledges that 
his model does not necessarily solve issues of favoritism 
and may, in fact, make government operators more 
vulnerable to it. 
 
Keating, J.M., Jr.  (1990). ―Public Over Private:  
Monitoring the Performance of Privately 
Operated Prisons and Jails.‖  In McDonald, D.C. 
[Ed.], Private Prisons and the Public Interest (pp. 
130-54).  New Brunswick, NJ:  Rutgers University 
Press. 
 
Keating describes a variety of accountability measures 
for privately-run prisons, noting the importance of 
oversight due to the frequent tension between the profit 
motive and the protection of human rights.  In the 
chapter, Keating outlines several monitoring 
mechanisms, including contract monitoring, document 
review, observation, financial audit, accreditation, 
administrative mechanisms—including the appointment 
of an ombudsman and grievance commission—and 
public scrutiny. 
 
McAfee, W.M. (1987). Tennessee‘s Private Prison Act of 
1986: An Historical Perspective with Special 
Attention to California‘s Experience. 40 
Vanderbilt Law Review 851-65 (May 1987).  
 
The author points out that the expense of state 
monitoring is one of the hidden costs of the private 
prison system.  He relates the experiences of a number 
of states that established external monitoring systems 
to conduct oversight of these private prisons.  
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B. Sexual Assault in Prison 
 
Hall-Martinez, K. (2006, February 9). Stop Prisoner 
Rape: Monitoring and Collaborating with 
Government to End Prison Rape. Written 
Testimony Submitted to the Commission on 
Safety and Abuse in America‘s Prisons – 4th 
Hearing. Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/hall-
martinez_katherine.pdf 
 
As co-executive director of Stop Prisoner Rape (now 
―Just Detention International‖), a non-governmental 
organization, Hall-Martinez describes the role that her 
organization plays in prison oversight by increasing 
awareness and transparency of prison conditions and 
sexual assault in prison.  The group also plans to 
educate and train prison officials on human rights in 
the hopes of bringing about policy change.  
 
Mariner, J. (2001). No escape: Male rape in U.S. prisons. 
New York: Human Rights Watch. Retrieved on 
May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/prison/report.ht
ml 
 
In addition to describing the frequency of prison rape, 
its horrific impact on prisoners, and the legal 
protections that exist, this important report describes 
how the lack of an independent oversight mechanism 
has contributed to the problem of sexual assault in 
prison.  The author notes that few correctional facilities 
participate in ACA‘s accreditation process, and that the 
effectiveness of judicial oversight has declined in recent 
years.  
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Rothstein, M. and Stannow, L. (2009, July).  Improving 
Prison Oversight to Address Sexual Violence in 
Detention.  Brief of the American Constitution 
Society for Law and Policy. Retrieved May 20, 
2010, from 
http://www.justdetention.org/pdf/ACSBrief.pdf 
 
This brief provides an overview of the problem of sexual 
abuse in American prisons and jails, and discusses the 
standards developed by the National Prison Rape 
Elimination Commission (PREA standards).  The 
authors note that the PREA standards require incident 
reviews, data collection, and independent audits of 
correctional facilities as a means of ensuring 
accountability in compliance with the standards.  The 
brief advocates for increased monitoring of prison 
conditions that give rise to sexual abuse, as well as 
effective monitoring of compliance with PREA 
standards. 
 
Thomas, D., et al. (1996).  All Too Familiar: Sexual Abuse 
of Women in U.S. State Prisons. New York: Human 
Rights Watch. Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.aclu.org/hrc/PrisonsStates.pdf 
 
An exhaustive report that describes applicable laws 
regarding sexual assault in prison and compares the 
situations of California, the District of Columbia, 
Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, and New York, with a focus 
on the occurrence of sexual abuse, the system‘s 
response, and recommendations.  The report finds that 
nearly every state reviewed lacked accountability to 
external monitors, and the authors highlight the need 
for independent oversight. 
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C. Mental Health/Disability 
 
The Correctional Association of New York. (2004).  
Mental health in the house of corrections:  A study 
of mental health care in New York state prisons.  
New York:  The Correctional Association of New 
York. Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.correctionalassociation.org/publicatio
ns/download/pvp/issue_reports/Mental-Health.pdf 
 
The Correctional Association of New York has statutory 
authority to monitor conditions in New York‘s prison 
facilities, and this report describes the methodology the 
organization used to investigate issues related to 
correctional mental health care.  The investigators 
conducted site visits between November 2001 and 
January 2003.  The staff took notes, reviewed inmate 
records, observed facility operations, inspected mental 
health units, and conducted surveys with inmates and 
staff.  The study used both quantitative and qualitative 
measures and the analysis was guided by secondary 
data and policy analysis. 
 
Human Rights Watch.  (2003).  Ill Equipped:  U.S. Prisons 
and Offenders with Mental Illness.  New York:  
Human Rights Watch.  Retrieved on May 20, 2010, 
from http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2003/10/21/ill-
equipped 
 
This important report by the international advocacy 
group Human Rights Watch (HRW) finds that America‘s 
prisons house three times more mentally ill individuals 
than the country‘s mental health facilities, and that 
prisons are often ill-equipped to treat such offenders. 
The report advocates several critical oversight 
measures, and argues that independent mental health 
experts should be given full access to prison medical 
records, staff, and prisoners.  These experts should 
monitor the diagnosis and treatment of prisoners, the 
availability of qualified staff and adequate facilities, 
types of therapeutic interventions, as well as policies 
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concerning disciplinary measures such as 
administrative segregation.  
 
U.S. National Council on Disability, American 
University, School of International Service, & 
Mental Disability Rights International. (2005, 
October 24). Monitoring Symposium: A 
Contribution to the Formulation of Proposals for 
Monitoring a United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of People with Disabilities Report. 
Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from U.S. National 
Council on Disability Web site: 
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2005/p
df/symposium.pdf  
 
While not directly related to prison issues, this report 
offers an interesting perspective on the creation of 
monitoring mechanisms to enforce a United Nations 
convention on the rights of persons with disabilities.  
The report compares currently established monitoring 
mechanisms, such as the OECD peer review system and 
the CPT torture inspections.  Symposium participants 
indicated that the development of a monitoring 
mechanism should address the following issues: 
adherence to human rights, transparency, capacity 
building and technical assistance, coordinating 
stakeholders, neutrality and expertise, adversarial 
versus cooperative processes, and lessons learned.  
 
D. Police Oversight 
 
Bobb, M. (2003). Civilian Oversight of the Police in the 
United States. 22 St. Louis University Public Law 
Review 151 (2003). Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.parc.info/client_files/Articles/1%20-
%20Civilian%20Oversight%20of%20the%20Police%
20%28Bobb%202003%29.pdf 
 
Merrick Bobb, the longtime police monitor for Los 
Angeles and head of a resource center focusing on best 
practices in police oversight, discusses the limitations of 
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internal police investigations and describes various 
options for placing police agencies under heightened 
civilian oversight and control.  Those options include the 
use of independent monitors (such as his role in Los 
Angeles), independent investigators (for example, the 
Office of Independent Review in Los Angeles and the 
Office of Professional Accountability in Seattle), and the 
more commonly seen civilian review boards.  In extreme 
cases, the federal government can also intervene and 
subject the police agency to settlement agreements and 
ongoing monitoring.    
 
Chech, M. (2005). Legislative Oversight of Police: Lessons 
Learned from the Police Handling of 
Demonstrations in Washington D.C. 32 Notre 
Dame Journal of Legislation (2005). Retrieved on 
May 20, 2010, from 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=852765 
 
This article argues that local legislative oversight and 
legislative investigations of police policies and practices 
are the most effective mechanism to ensure law 
enforcement compliance with human rights standards. 
The benefits of legislative oversight include an ability to 
address policies on a broader systemic level, greater 
police cooperation, and an ability to move forward at a 
relatively faster speed than litigation, when compared 
to more traditional police oversight mechanisms.  The 
article outlines the keys to successful legislative 
investigation, identifies the shortcomings of this 
oversight model, and cautions that no one model of 
oversight is enough when it comes to police misconduct.   
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Gordon-Reed, A. (1995). Watching the Protectors: 
Independent Oversight of Municipal Law 
Enforcement Agencies. New York Law School Law 
Review 87-111 (1995). 
 
Recognizing that police and corrections officers hold a 
great deal of power over people in their custody, Gordon-
Reed argues that outside scrutiny and oversight is 
especially appropriate in this arena.  Using the New 
York City Board of Corrections as a model, she traces 
the mid-1990‘s debate between the mayor and the city 
council of New York over the creation of a new, 
independent oversight committee for the City‘s police 
department.  She presents her perspective on the role 
that oversight serves, the problems oversight can create, 
and how such an oversight agency should be structured 
in order to accomplish its mission. 
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Lemgruber, J. (2002, September). Civilian Oversight of 
the Police in Brazil: The case of the ombudsman’s 
offices. Center for Studies on Public Security and 
Citizenship (Centro de Estudos de Segurança e 
Cidadania / CESeC) at the University Candido 
Mendes.  Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from Centro 
de Estudios de Justicia de las America‘s Website:  
http://www.cejamericas.org/doc/documentos/cesce
c-civilian-oversight.pdf 
 
CESeC evaluated police ombudsman‘s offices in five 
Brazilian states in order to describe and evaluate 
routines, to determine the satisfaction by both citizens 
who had lodged complaints and by police officers who 
were the targets of complaints, to compare the 
ombudsman approach with other models of civilian 
oversight, and to propose a new model that contributes 
to democratic policies.  The author, Julita Lemgruber, 
was herself an Ombudsman before becoming the 
director of the CESeC.  The external control comes from 
the Public Prosecutor‘s Office which is midway between 
the executive and the judiciary branches, giving it a 
margin of independence the author argues is equivalent 
to or greater than many of the civilian oversight 
mechanisms around the world.  The report contains 
numerous suggestions for the improvement of this 
oversight mechanism and ends with some basic 
parameters for evaluation of impact.  
 
National Association of Civilian Oversight of Law 
Enforcement (2010). www.nacole.org 
 
NACOLE is a national association of organizations that 
provide oversight of police and other law enforcement 
agencies.  The association‘s website contains a wealth of 
resources about the police oversight bodies that exist in 
the United States and internationally, and provides 
links to numerous articles about this topic.  NACOLE 
also holds an annual conference, offers professional 
standards for oversight entities, and sponsors a listserv 
with frequent articles about oversight-related topics. 
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Quinn, S. (2009, October). Models of Civilian Oversight in 
the United States: Similarities, Differences, 
Expectations and Resources. Retrieved on May 20, 
2010, from 
http://www.keywestcity.com/egov/docs/2572912578
85436.pdf 
 
This relatively short paper is packed with information 
about the different police oversight models used around 
the United States.  It has helpful comparisons of the 
different models in use by examining the strengths and 
weaknesses of each model.  It also describes the 
appropriate use of public documents and offers readers 
tips on how to start the process of creating an oversight 
body. 
 
Stone, C. (2005, October). Police Accountability and the 
Quality of Oversight. Summary of Conference on 
Police Accountability and the Quality of 
Oversight: Global Trends in National Context. 
Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from 
http://www.altus.org/pdf/cs_spac_oct2005_en.pdf  
 
This excellent paper summarizes the discussions from a 
major international conference on police accountability 
and identifies six major questions that emerged from 
plenary sessions.  Those six overarching questions 
frame the paper, and include topics such as: to whose 
standards the police should be held accountable; the 
definition of success in police oversight; the division of 
labor between external and internal oversight 
mechanisms; the role the media has to play in police 
oversight; the potential oversight contributions of non-
governmental organizations; and the role of research.  
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Walker, S. (2005). The New World of Police 
Accountability. Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications.  
 
The book begins by examining traditional methods of 
police accountability, such as oversight through the 
courts and the legislature, and identifies the 
accomplishments and limitations of these oversight 
methods.  It also explores internal oversight 
mechanisms such as use of force reporting and 
administrative strategies such as internal affairs 
investigations.  Author Samuel Walker argues, however, 
that the there are new monitoring tools that provide 
more effective oversight of the police.  One of these new 
mechanisms is the auditor model of police oversight, 
which he favors over civilian review boards because the 
auditor model focuses on organizational change.  The 
book ends with an evaluation of the continued success of 
this new oversight mechanism and highlights the 
potential it has for controlling day-to-day police work, 
enhancing frontline supervision, and for preventing 
misconduct in the first place. 
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